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In Spring 2020, as the COVID-19 pandemic shuttered most 
entertainment outside the home, millions of Americans downloaded 
their new favorite productivity drain: TikTok. The app, which has 
accumulated more than 100 million monthly users across the United 
States,1 allows users to watch and share 60-second videos on virtually 
any topic. As they scroll through their homepages, users see videos that 
reflect their preferences, which are identified by TikTok’s algorithm. 
Although TikTok purports to “inspire creativity,”2 some U.S. 
lawmakers see a much more insidious motive: capture consumers’ 
personal data3 for use by hostile foreign governments.4 Because 
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 1.  Alex Sherman, TikTok Reveals Detailed User Number for the First Time, CNBC (Aug. 
24, 2020), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/08/24/tiktok-reveals-us-global-user-growth-numbers-for-
first-time.html. 
 2.  About TikTok, TIKTOK, https://www.tiktok.com/about?lang=en (last visited Mar. 5, 
2021).  
 3.  “Personal data” or “personal information” has a broad definition. Throughout this Note, 
I refer to personal data as any information which identifies or could be linked to an individual or 
their household. See, e.g., California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA), OFF. OF THE ATT’Y GEN. 
OF CAL., https://oag.ca.gov/privacy/ccpa (last visited Nov. 3, 2020) (“For example, [personal data] 
could include your name, social security number, email address, records of products purchased, 
internet browsing history, geolocation data, fingerprints, and inferences from other personal 
information that could create a profile about your preferences and characteristics.”).   
 4.  See Jack Nicas et al., TikTok Said to Be Under National Security Review, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 1, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/01/technology/tiktok-national-security-
review.html (describing national security review of Bytedance acquisition of Musical.ly, a TikTok 
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TikTok’s parent company, Bytedance, is based in the People’s Republic 
of China, legislators are concerned that Chinese law compels the 
platform to share user data with the Chinese government.5 TikTok 
concedes that it collects user data, but maintains that the data is held 
on U.S.-based servers and is not shared with any government officials.6 
Despite TikTok’s reassurances, a U.S. Department of Defense memo 
sent to various military agencies in December 2019 noted a “potential 
risk associated with the TikTok app” and advised military personnel to 
delete it.7 
Interestingly, TikTok uses the same data mining practices as many 
other companies.8 The threat TikTok allegedly poses—that, as a 
Chinese company, it could be compelled to share information with the 
Chinese government—is shared by many popular gaming platforms.9 
These platforms, which produce widely used video games like Fortnite, 
are also created by Chinese companies and similarly collect user data.10 
Further, the concerns about TikTok say nothing of the risk that the 
Chinese government could acquire Americans’ personal data by other 
means, like hacking into U.S. databases or legally buying data from data 
brokers.11 
Despite the apparent ordinariness of TikTok’s data practices, on 
August 6, 2020, President Trump issued an executive order banning the 
app, asserting that TikTok’s data mining practices “threaten the 
 
precursor); see also, Christopher Wray, Dir., Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Address at the Hudson 
Institute: The Threat Posed by the Chinese Government and the Chinese Communist Party to 
the Economic and National Security of the United States (July 7, 2020) (“The greatest long-term 
threat to our nation’s information and intellectual property, and to our economic vitality, is the 
counterintelligence and economic espionage threat from China. It’s a threat to our economic 
security—and by extension, to our national security.”). 
 5.  Letter from Sen. Charles E. Schumer & Sen. Tom Cotton to Joseph Maguire, Acting 
Dir. of National Intelligence (Oct. 23, 2019) (on file with United States Senate).  
 6.  See Privacy Policy, TIKTOK, https://www.tiktok.com/legal/privacy-policy?lang=en (last 
updated Dec. 20, 2020) (explaining that Tiktok collects usage information, device information, 
location data, messages, metadata, and cookies).  
 7.  Neil Vigdor, U.S. Military Branches Block Access to TikTok App Amid Pentagon 
Warning, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 4, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/04/us/tiktok-pentagon-
military-ban.html. 
 8.  Keman Huang & Stuart Madnick, The TikTok Ban Should Worry Every Company, 
HARV. BUS. REV. (Aug. 28, 2020), https://hbr.org/2020/08/the-tiktok-ban-should-worry-every-
company. 
 9.  Aynne Kokas, China Already Has Your Data. Trump’s Tiktok and Wechat Bans Can’t 
Stop That., WASH. POST (Aug. 11, 2020), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/08/11/tiktok-wechat-bans-ineffective/. 
 10.  Id.  
 11.  See infra Part II. 
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national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States.”12 
Since the announcement was made, the move has been harshly 
criticized as a political distraction that infringes on the First 
Amendment rights of TikTok’s users,13 and alternatively, praised for 
confronting Chinese data collection tactics.14 Whether a ban will 
actually take effect is a different question, as the Biden Administration 
indicated it might drop the issue entirely.15 
Although TikTok is the cybersecurity16 controversy de rigueur, the 
debate about its data mining practices reflects more fundamental 
questions about the governance of our personal data: Is personal data 
privacy truly a national security concern? If so, how should we regulate 
it? 
Ineffective personal data privacy regulation poses a grave national 
security risk—namely, that our data could be misused by hostile actors. 
However, protection of personal data cannot be successfully 
implemented through ad hoc maneuvering like the TikTok ban. 
Instead, effective protection requires comprehensive legislation that 
addresses what data is allowed to be collected, and what companies can 
do with it. 
Although President Trump seemed to agree that personal data 
security is of paramount concern, his approach to addressing the issue 
is ultimately untenable.17 In imposing the ban on TikTok, the 
President’s Executive Order cited to powers granted under the 
 
 12.  Exec. Order No. 13942, 85 Fed. Reg. 48,637 (Aug. 11, 2020).  
 13.  Mike Isaac & David McCabe, TikTok Wins Repreive from U.S. Ban, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 
27, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/27/technology/tiktok-ban-ruling-app.html.  
 14.  James Jay Carafono, Why Trump’s TikTok Battle With China Is Worth Fighting, 
HERITAGE FOUND. (Aug. 6, 2020), https://www.heritage.org/cybersecurity/commentary/why-
trumps-tiktok-battle-china-worth-fighting. 
 15.  See Unopposed Motion to Hold Appeal in Abeyance at 2, Marland v. Trump, No. 20-
4597, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 202572, at *38–39 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 30, 2020), appeal docketed sub nom 
Marland v. Biden, No. 20-3322 (3d Cir. Feb. 10, 2021) (The Department of Justice moved to stay 
the case pending in the Third Circuit after the Trump Administration’s claims were dismissed and 
appealed); see also Tiktok Inc. v. Trump, No. 1:20-cv-02658, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177250, at *3 
(D.D.C. Sept. 27, 2020) (dismissing the Trump Administration’s case against TikTok).  
 16.  By “cybersecurity,” I refer broadly to the frameworks that protect data. See also Dan 
Craigen et al., Defining Cybersecurity, 4 TECH. INNOVATION MGMT. REV. 13, 13 (discussing 
various definitions of cybersecurity). 
 17.  See Donald J. Trump (@realdonaldtrump), TWITTER (Aug. 23, 2019, 11:58 AM), 
https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?dates=%5B%222019-08-23%22%2C%222019-08-
24%22%5D (“For all the Fake News Reporters that don’t have a clue as to what the law is relative 
to Presidential powers, China, etc., try looking at the Emergency Economic Powers Act of 
1977. Case closed!”). 
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International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977 (IEEPA).18 
The IEEPA empowers the President to impose economic sanctions to 
confront “any unusual or extraordinary threat” to national security that 
has its origins outside the U.S.19 The President may exercise these 
powers after he declares a national emergency in accordance with the 
National Emergencies Act (NEA).20 
Congress originally enacted the IEEPA to provide a check on 
executive power.21 In doing so, Congress defined three limitations on 
the President’s authority. First, the powers under the statute may only 
be invoked during times of national emergency.22 According to a House 
Report on the IEEPA, national emergencies are “rare and brief, and 
are not to be equated with normal ongoing problems.”23 The second 
limitation gave Congress the power to review and terminate the 
national emergency.24 Congress was to meet every six months to discuss 
whether to veto the President’s executive order declaring emergency.25 
The third constraint precluded regulation of “personal 
communications” or “informational materials” under the IEEPA,26 
which include films, photographs, CD-ROMs, etc.27 
Despite these efforts to limit executive power, the IEEPA is now 
being used contrary to its legislative intent. Over time, Presidents have 
used IEEPA powers expansively and with greater frequency to further 
foreign policy objectives.28 Further, Supreme Court decisions 
 
 18.  Exec. Order No. 13942, 85 Fed. Reg. 48,637 (Aug. 11, 2020). 
 19.  International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701–08 (2018).  
 20.  National Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601–51 (2018). 
 21.  CHRISTOPER A. CASEY ET AL., CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45618, THE INTERNATIONAL 
EMERGENCY ECONOMIC POWERS ACT: ORIGINS, EVOLUTION, AND USE 6–9 (2020).  
 22.  50 U.S.C. § 1701(b). 
 23.  H.R. REP. NO. 95-459, at 10 (1977). 
 24.  50 U.S.C. § 1706(b). 
 25.  50 U.S.C. § 1706(d); see also Harold H. Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always Wins 
in Foreign Affairs: Lessons of the Iran Contra Affair, 97 YALE L.J. 1255, 1264 (1988) (“Congress 
drafted IEEPA specifically to narrow the President’s authority in nonwartime situations, 
conditioning his exercise of emergency powers upon prior congressional consultation, subsequent 
review, and legislative veto termination provisions.”). 
 26.  50 U.S.C. § 1702(b). 
 27.  Id. 
 28.  CASEY ET AL., supra note 21, at 17; see also id. at 52–53, 60–63 (comparing President 
Reagan’s declaration of four national emergencies to President Obama’s eleven throughout their 
respective presidency); see also Gregory Korte, White House: States of Emergency are Just 
Formalities, USA TODAY (Apr. 9, 2015), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2015/04/09/pro-forma-states-of-national-
emergency/25479553/ (noting that after President Obama froze Venezuelan assets under the 
IEEPA, the administration later admitted that Venezuela did not pose a threat to the U.S. at all, 
and the national emergency declaration was merely a formality).  
FAISON_03_11_21_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 3/11/2021  10:16 AM 
2021] TIKTOK, IEEPA, & DATA PRIVACY 119 
undermined Congress’s oversight mechanisms and declared the 
legislative veto invalid.29 The Court upheld the President’s broad 
authority under the IEEPA,30 reflecting the well-established belief that 
foreign affairs are primarily the province of the executive branch.31 
In banning TikTok under the IEEPA, the Trump Administration 
evinces an overreach of executive power—the kind that the IEEPA 
intended to prevent. Indeed, it seems odd that the IEEPA could be 
invoked to oppose foreign adversaries that are “increasingly creating 
and exploiting vulnerabilities in information and communications 
technology and services . . . in order to commit . . . economic and 
industrial espionage against the United States and its people.”32 By the 
Trump Administration’s own definition, then, the security issues posed 
by TikTok are neither rare nor brief.33 
Therefore, it is invalid to use the IEEPA to regulate threats to 
Americans’ personal data. First, these risks are not extraordinary 
national emergencies at all. Instead, these are known, widespread 
national security threats that require more comprehensive solutions. 
Second, the ban on TikTok violates the IEEPA carve-out on 
informational materials. Finally, given the extensiveness of the personal 
data security risk, Congress should have a greater role in regulation 
than an IEEPA framework would allow. Accordingly, this Note argues 
that personal data security cannot be adequately regulated through the 
framework mandated by the IEEPA, and instead requires a broad, 
long-term solution. 
Part I will survey prior efforts to address personal data privacy in 
the U.S. to show how inattention to the risks posed by personal data 
collection created a fractured privacy framework ripe for exploitation. 
Part II will examine the widespread risks inherent in the personal data 
marketplace and will demonstrate the need for an ongoing resolution 
 
 29.  See generally Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222 (1984) (upholding use of emergency powers 
against Cuba pursuant to the IEEPA); see also INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (invalidating 
the legislative veto); see also Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981) (giving broad 
interpretation to the President’s IEEPA authorities).  
 30.  Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 678 (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 
343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)).  
 31.  See Koh, supra note 25, at 1305 (“Whether on the merits or on justiciability grounds, the 
courts 
have held for the President in [foreign affairs] cases with astonishing regularity.”).  
 32.  Exec. Order No. 13873, 84 Fed. Reg. 22,689 (May 17, 2019) (emphasis added). 
 33.  See Defendants’ Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary 
Injunction at 5, TikTok Inc. v. Trump, No. 1:20-CV-2658-CJN (D.D.C. Sept. 25, 2020) (describing 
China as a “persistent” and “growing” threat).  
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to those national security threats. Part III will argue that application of 
the IEEPA is inappropriate to regulate personal data privacy; the 
statute is not designed to bear on events that are not a “state of 
emergency,” exempts personal communications and informational 
materials from its reach, and improperly limits Congress’s role. Part IV 
will suggest that comprehensive congressional legislation is needed, 
and looks to California’s Data Privacy legislation as a model for a 
federal data protection law. 
I.  PATCHWORK PROTECTION: DATA PRIVACY IN THE UNITED 
STATES 
This Part provides an overview of the security risks posed by 
inadequate personal data protection law. However, it is important to 
first understand the existing data privacy framework in the United 
States. This Part begins by surveying the judicial approach to privacy 
and the patchwork of federal data protection legislation. Prior 
administrations’ cybersecurity efforts misunderstood the scope of the 
national security problem, leaving significant gaps in the protection of 
our personal data. Partially as a result of the U.S. government’s 
response, inadequate data protection policy continues to pose the risk 
that our personal data may be used to benefit our adversaries. 
Cambridge Analytica’s interference in the 2016 election exemplified 
this danger. 
A.  U.S. Data Privacy: Judicial Interpretation and Federal Legislative 
Framework 
Neither the courts nor Congress have created robust privacy 
protection in the United States. Unlike the courts of other countries, 
the U.S. Supreme Court has declined to recognize an informational 
privacy right in the Constitution,34 affording constitutional protection 
only to privacy invasions by the government, rather than by private, 
hostile actors.35 Some judicial theorists believe that a constitutional 
right to informational privacy does not exist in any context.36 
To the extent an informational privacy right might exist in the U.S., 
 
 34.  See STEPHEN P. MULLIGAN ET AL., CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45631, DATA PROTECTION 
LAW: AN OVERVIEW 5 (2019) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967)) (noting that 
the Fourth Amendment is not read to protect a “general” right to privacy). 
 35.  Id.  
 36.  See NASA v. Nelson, 562 U.S. 134, 160 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“A federal 
constitutional right to ‘informational privacy’ does not exist.”). 
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it only extends to criminal law. In Carpenter v. United States, the 
Supreme Court determined whether police could use location tracking 
records from a suspect’s cell phone without a warrant.37 The Court 
concluded that the Fourth Amendment protects a reasonable 
expectation of privacy, and allowing government access to location 
tracking data “contravenes that expectation.”38 Although Carpenter 
acknowledges a distinction between privacy in a digital context and 
traditional forms of privacy, the Court’s relative indifference to 
informational privacy has changed little in the digital age. 
Congress has enacted a limited number of personal informational 
privacy measures, creating a discordant patchwork of protections that 
leave significant areas unregulated.39 Only a few major pieces of 
legislation actually impose data protection requirements on database 
operators, in addition to requiring consumer consent for sharing data. 
Of note, the Communications Act of 1934, and its amendments in 1996, 
impose data security requirements on “common carriers,” namely, 
telephone services, cable operators and satellite carriers.40 The 
Graham-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) imposes obligations on financial 
institutions to protect consumer personal information.41 Similarly, the 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) 
requires health care providers to protect patients’ personal health 
information and adopt privacy standards.42 However, these measures 
have been criticized for offering too many loopholes that allow 
dissemination of personal information to third parties by record-
keepers.43 Other legislation, like the Fair Credit Reporting Act, does not 
impose any restrictions on the maintenance of information, but rather 
imposes only consumer disclosure requirements.44 
The agencies tasked with enforcement of these provisions, the 
 
 37.  Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2212, 2216 (2018). 
 38.  Id. at 2217.  
 39.  Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 
114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 587 (2014) (“The statutory law regulating privacy is diffuse and 
discordant . . . . This sectoral approach also leaves large areas unregulated . . . .”).   
 40.  See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996) (codified 
in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.); 47 U.S.C. § 153(51).  
 41.  Graham-Leach-Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801–6809 (2018). 
 42.  Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 
Stat. 1936 (codified in scattered sections of 18, 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.). 
 43.  See R. Bradley McMahon, After Billions Spent to Comply with HIPAA and GLBA 
Privacy Provisions, Why Is Identity Theft the Most Prevalent Crime in America, 49 VILL. L. REV. 
625, 651 (2004) (“Both laws, however, 
contain loopholes that allow entities to disseminate personal information.”). 
 44.  Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1681x (2018).   
FAISON_03_11_21_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 3/11/2021  10:16 AM 
122 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SIDEBAR [VOL. 16 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau (CFPB), enjoy broad discretion to implement these 
requirements.45 But the fact remains that most U.S. citizens have little 
control over what personal data is collected, who can access their data, 
and how third parties can use it.46 
B.  Presidential Efforts to Address Cybersecurity 
This piecemeal legislation makes more sense when considered 
against the backdrop of the federal government’s slow acceptance of 
the cybersecurity risk. In particular, the government’s failure to 
recognize the danger of inadequate protection of personal, rather than 
governmental, data led to the data security incidents we see today. 
In 1996, President Clinton enacted Executive Order 13,010, titled 
Critical Infrastructure Protection.47 This Order was one of the first 
national acknowledgements of a “cyber threat,” defined as a 
“computer-based attack[] on the information or communications 
components that control critical infrastructures.”48 E.O. 13,010 
established a commission to report on and recommend resolutions to 
cyber threats on governmental data.49 Although the Clinton 
Administration did not address personal data beyond the enactment of 
the GLBA and HIPPA, President Clinton’s efforts were not without 
some benefit. Importantly, the Clinton Administration classified the 
cyber threat as a national security issue, of the same importance as a 
physical attack. Recognition of these national security implications 
encouraged subsequent administrations to prioritize the issue. 
Initially, the Bush Administration seemed poised to continue 
building on the Clinton’s Administration’s cyber framework, but 9/11 
changed everything. Where the Clinton Administration believed the 
cyber threat could be as serious as a physical attack, after 9/11 the Bush 
Administration, unsurprisingly, refocused national security policy on 
physical threats.50 As a result, the Bush Administration’s efforts to 
 
 45.  See MULLIGAN, supra note 34, at 30, 35 (noting that the FTC covers a “broad range” of 
activity and the CFPB may take “any” action to prevent covered entities from engaging in 
deceptive practices). 
 46.  See id. at 55 (proposed legislation may afford citizens the legal right to “control the use 
and dissemination of personal data . . . [and require companies to define] how data is 
disseminated or disclosed to third parties”).  
 47.  Exec. Order No. 13010, 61 Fed. Reg. 37347 (Jul. 15, 1996). 
 48.  Id.  
 49.  Id. 
 50.  Kevin P. Newmeyer, Who Should Lead U.S. Cybersecurity Efforts?, 3 PRISM 115, 117 
(2012).  
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regulate personal data security were minimal in comparison to its 
broader national security efforts. 
Nonetheless, the Bush Administration did implement some data 
security policies. In 2003, it issued a report titled the National Strategy 
to Secure Cyberspace.51 The report identified cybersecurity as a key 
national security issue but still recommended that the federal 
government take a backseat to private efforts: “[F]ederal regulation 
will not become a primary means of securing cyberspace . . . the market 
itself is expected to provide the major impetus to improve 
cybersecurity.”52 Additionally, in 2008, the Bush Administration 
established the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative 
(CNCI), a set of projects which aimed to reduce online security 
vulnerabilities, protect against intrusions, and anticipate future cyber-
attacks.53 
Neither of those efforts proved sufficient. The 2003 Report 
dangerously mischaracterized the proper role of the national 
government by yielding control of the issue to private companies. As 
critics of the 2003 Report realized, in no other area of national security 
does the government rely almost exclusively on market forces or 
private efforts.54 In turn, the 2008 CNCI went too far in the other 
direction—it was heavily classified and its only focus was on protection 
of government data (“.gov” protection).55 
The Obama Administration, on the other hand, prioritized data 
privacy as a national security issue. The administration expanded the 
focus of federal privacy protection, encompassing not just 
governmental security, but personal data security as well. Almost 
immediately after taking office, President Obama implemented a sixty-
day review of U.S. cybersecurity policy.56 The review culminated in a 
 
 51.  WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL STRATEGY TO SECURE CYBERSPACE 15 (2003), 
available at https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/cyberspace_strategy.pdf. 
 52.  Id. 
 53.  JOHN ROLLINS & ANNA C. HENNING, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R40427, COMPREHENSIVE 
NAT’L CYBERSECURITY INITIATIVE: LEGAL AUTHORITIES AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 1 
(2009).  
 54.  See CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUDIES, SECURING CYBERSPACE FOR THE 44TH 
PRESIDENCY: REP. OF THE CSIS COMMISSION ON CYBERSECURITY FOR THE 44TH PRESIDENCY 
50 (2008) (“In pursuing the laudable goal of avoiding overregulation, the strategy essentially 
abandoned cyber defense to ad hoc market forces. . . . In no other area of national security do we 
depend on private, voluntary efforts.”). 
 55. See id. at 15 (“The CNCI has its focus on defending government—.gov, in other words—
an approach that skilled opponents will be able to outflank.”).  
 56.  FED’N OF AM. SCIENTISTS, CYBERSPACE POLICY REVIEW: ASSURING A TRUSTED AND 
RESILIENT INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE iii (2009), available at 
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ten-point action plan to strengthen federal policy for both personal and 
governmental protection.57 During President Obama’s time in office, 
the administration delivered on most of the goals of the action plan. 
First, President Obama tasked a cybersecurity czar, Howard Schmidt, 
with developing a national cyber policy.58 The Obama Administration 
improved coordination among federal agencies, delineating the 
appropriate roles for the DHS, the FBI, and the Office of the Director 
of National Intelligence in the wake of a cyber-attack.59 The National 
Institute of Standards and Technology (a division of the Department of 
Commerce) improved public-private cybersecurity relationships by 
developing industry-best practices for cybersecurity management, 
which were widely implemented by the private sector.60 
Despite these steps forward, the Obama Administration failed to 
implement the comprehensive personal data privacy policy they had 
envisioned. The centerpiece of the Obama Administration’s data 
privacy legislation, a Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights, did not gain 
traction in Congress. Unlike the Bush Administration’s efforts, the 
Privacy Bill of Rights posited that consumer privacy was a fundamental 
right that could not be left in the hands of industry.61 The proposal was 
nevertheless decried by privacy advocates as insufficient. Conversely, 
technology companies characterized it as unduly burdensome.62 
President Obama’s term ended shortly after an unprecedented 
cyber intrusion on one of our nation’s most vital institutions: fair and 
free elections. In 2010, Facebook launched OpenGraph, a service that 
 
https://fas.org/irp/eprint/cyber-review.pdf. 
 57.  Id. at vi.  
 58.  Larry Greenmeier, Obama Chooses Howard Schmidt to Coordinate National 
Cybersecurity, SCI. AM. (Dec. 22, 2009), 
https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/observations/obama-chooses-howard-schmidt-to-
coordinate-national-cybersecurity/.  
 59.  Travis D. Howard & Jose de Arimateia da Cruz, Stay the Course: Why Trump Must 
Build on Obama’s Cybersecurity Policy, 26 INFO. SEC. J.: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 276, 277 
(2017). 
 60.  See id. For example, NIST recommended a five-step framework for responding to cyber 
incidents—Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond, Recover. NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., 
FRAMEWORK FOR IMPROVING CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE CYBERSECURITY 4 (2014), 
available at https://www.nist.gov/system/files/documents/cyberframework/cybersecurity-
framework-021214.pdf.   
 61.  See WHITE HOUSE, ADMINISTRATION DISCUSSION DRAFT: CONSUMER PRIVACY BILL 
OF RIGHTS ACT (2015) (“The Congress finds that . . . Americans cherish privacy as an element of 
their individual freedom.”). 
 62.  Brendan Sasso, Obama’s ‘Privacy Bill of Rights’ Gets Bashed from All Sides, ATLANTIC 
(Feb. 27, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/02/obamas-privacy-bill-of-
rights-gets-bashed-from-all-sides/456576/. 
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allowed external app developers to reach out to Facebook users for 
access to their—and crucially, their Facebook friends’—personal 
information.63 In 2013, the research company GlobalScienceResearch, 
in collaboration with political consulting firm Cambridge Analytica, 
created an app that prompted users to answer questions for a 
psychological profile.64 By participating, a user gave Cambridge 
Analytica access to her and her friends’ personal information.65 
Although Facebook removed OpenGraph’s access to friends’ data in 
2014, the rule did not apply retroactively.66 So, from an initial 270,000 
people who took the quiz, Cambridge Analytica amassed data on 87 
million Facebook profiles.67 In 2016, Cambridge Analytica passed that 
data to the presidential campaigns of Donald Trump and Ted Cruz, 
which allegedly used the data to develop intensive voter profiles and 
target political advertisements to Facebook users.68 Cambridge 
Analytica may have also passed data to Russia, which interfered in the 
general election in favor of President Trump.69 
The Cambridge Analytica scandal, more than anything, epitomizes 
the dangers of inadequate personal data protections. Although hacking 
of government systems may be a real threat, prior administrations’ 
singular focus on that issue demonstrates a failure to understand the 
breadth of the national security problem. Efforts like the Obama 
Administration’s Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights would have 
ultimately permitted tech companies to take whatever data they 
wanted, but imposed restrictions on its distribution.70 Thus, even 
 
 63.  See Sam Meredith, Facebook-Cambridge Analytica: A Timeline of the Data Hijacking 
Scandal, CNBC (Apr. 10, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/04/10/facebook-cambridge-
analytica-a-timeline-of-the-data-hijacking-scandal.html (“If accepted, these apps would then 
have access to a user’s name, gender, location, birthday, education, political preferences, 
relationship status, religious views, online chat status and more. In fact, with additional 
permissions, external sites could also gain access to a person’s private messages.”). 
 64.  Id. 
 65.  Id.  
 66.  Id. 
 67.  Matthew Rosenberg et al., How Trump Consultants Exploited the Facebook Data of 
Millions, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/17/us/politics/cambridge-
analytica-trump-campaign.html; Cecilia Kang & Sheera Frankel, Facebook Says Cambridge 
Analytica Harvested Data of Up to 87 Million Users, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/04/technology/mark-zuckerberg-testify-congress.html.  
 68.  Id. 
 69.  Danny Hakim & Matthew Rosenberg, Data Firm Tied to Trump Campaign Talked 
Business with Russians, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/17/us/politics/cambridge-analytica-russia.html.  
 70.  See Sasso, supra note 62 (“Instead, companies and industry associations would write 
their own rules and then ask the FTC to sign off on them.”). 
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measures specifically meant to protect personal data failed to target the 
real problem: Allowing expansive data mining increases the risk that 
data will be used to benefit our adversaries. 
II.  TIKTOK IS NOT UNIQUE: PERVASIVE THREATS POSED BY THE 
MARKETPLACE FOR PERSONAL DATA 
Although the United States recognized early on that cybersecurity 
could become a major national security issue and instituted policies 
protecting governmental data, policymakers failed to appreciate the 
risk created by personal data mining. Thus, personal data security 
efforts to date have been inadequate.71 
This brings us back to TikTok. Although TikTok is accused of 
mining personal data for the benefit of the Chinese government, the 
national security risk that TikTok poses—that Americans’ personal 
data can end up in the hands of a foreign government—is hardly unique 
to TikTok.72 Thus, this Part will describe how the marketplace for 
personal data creates ongoing cyber threats that cannot be ameliorated 
by banning one company outright, because hostile actors can acquire 
data in other ways. 
Generally, there are three ways that personal data could be 
acquired by a foreign government. First is the accusation levied against 
TikTok: that any foreign company requesting personal data could be 
compelled to give that data to their government. Second, systems 
storing personal data could be hacked. Finally, some companies could 
be selling personal data to hostile actors. 
No matter how it is acquired, Americans’ personal data in the 
possession of a hostile foreign government poses a threat to our 
national security. There are many specific consequences of hostile 
actors’ acquisition of personal data, including the spread of propaganda 
in an effort to influence American elections and use of personal data 
to extort, blackmail, and even recruit U.S. citizens to share confidential 
government information. These consequences demonstrate why 
protecting our personal data demands a comprehensive national 
solution. 
 
 71.  See SUSAN A. AARONSON, DATA IS DANGEROUS: COMPARING THE RISKS THAT THE 
UNITED STATES, CANADA, AND GERMANY SEE IN DATA TROVES 8 (2020) (“[N]etizens of the 
United States have little recourse to ensure that their personal data does not put them or their 
fellow Americans at risk.”). 
 72.  Graham Webster, The Risks TikTok Poses Are Not At All Unique to TikTok, SLATE 
(Aug. 3, 2020), https://slate.com/technology/2020/08/tiktok-ban-microsoft-trump-china-risk.html.  
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A.  TikTok and Other Companies Can Be Compelled to Share Data 
The fear that TikTok or other foreign-based companies operating 
in the U.S. could be compelled to pass off users’ data to China or 
elsewhere is legitimate.73 For example, China’s Cybersecurity Law 
requires Chinese companies to “provide technical support and 
assistance to public security organs and national security organs that 
are safeguarding national security and investigating criminal activities 
in accordance with the law.”74 Although what constitutes compliance is 
unclear and often results in protracted negotiations, the fact remains 
that the Chinese government can acquire effectively any information it 
wants.75 Likewise, apps developed in Russia pose the same threat.76 
B.  Collection of Personal Data and Risk of Hack 
The risks associated with foreign governments compelling access to 
data, however, presents only a small portion of the overarching 
personal data security concern. The real threat resides in the mass 
collection of personal consumer information—known today as “big 
data.” 
To understand the ubiquity of technology companies’ data mining 
practices, it is important to understand the personal data marketplace. 
Personal data refers to the mass of data about an individual that 
different technologies collect every day. For example, Facebook collects 
user data not only from an indvidual’s Facebook activity, but also 
through partnerships with other major technology companies, such as 
Spotify, Netflix, Amazon, etc.77 The result is a nearly symbiotic 
relationship: Facebook collects data from Amazon using cookies, which 
informs how Facebook presents information to users, which, in turn, 
informs Amazon’s targeted advertising strategy for a given user.78 In 
 
 73.  See Dangerous Partners: Big Tech & Beijng: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime & 
Terrorism of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. 2 (2020) (statement of Samm Sacks, 
Senior Fellow, Yale Law School’s Paul Tsai China Center) (“[T]he way Chinese companies 
handle U.S. citizen data does impact U.S. national security.”).   
 74.  Id. at 4.  
 75.  Id. at 7.  
 76.  See Letter from Jill C. Tyson, Assistant Director, Office of Congressional Affairs, 
Federal Bureau of Investigation to Sen. Charles E. Schumer (Nov. 25, 2019) (on file with United 
States Senate) (“The FBI considers any mobile application or similar product developed in 
Russia, such as FaceApp, to be a potential counterintelligence threat . . . .”) 
 77.  See Gabriel J.X. Dance et al., As Facebook Raised a Privacy Wall, it Carved an Opening 
for Tech Giants, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 18, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/18/technology/facebook-privacy.html (reporting that 
Facebook allowed technology companies expansive access to user data).  
 78.  Id.  
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general, technology companies use this collection of personal data to 
create a more personalized user experience. 
These scraps of data are oftentimes packaged and resold by data 
brokers, which are  companies that aggregate users’ personal data to 
build a composite of their lives.79 Data brokers collect information from 
publicly available sources (e.g., property records), social media, other 
data brokers and commercial sources,80 and then build profiles based 
on that data, categorizing those profiles into different segments.81 As an 
FTC Report detailed 
[I]n developing their products, the data brokers use not only the raw 
data they obtain from these sources, such as a person’s name, 
address, home ownership status, or age, but also certain derived data, 
which they infer about consumers. For example, a data broker might 
infer that an individual with a boating license has an interest in 
boating, that a consumer has a technology interest based on the 
purchase of a “Wired” magazine subscription, or that a consumer 
who has bought two Ford cars has loyalty to that brand.82 
These inferences are then used to package consumer information 
for marketing, risk mitigation and people-search products.83 Data 
brokers collect and store information on nearly every American 
household and the industry is estimated to be worth $200 billion.84 
Whether we know it or not, data brokers are keeping tabs on all of us. 
This mass data collection creates the inherent risk that these 
systems, maintained by data brokers and other companies, could be 
hacked by a foreign state actor. The consequences of a data breach are 
severe: In 2017, Equifax, a credit-reporting agency that also functions as 
 
 79.  FED. TRADE COMM’N, DATA BROKERS: A CALL FOR TRANSPARENCY AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY iv (2014), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/data-brokers-
call-transparency-accountability-report-federal-trade-commission-may-
2014/140527databrokerreport.pdf.  
 80.  Id. at 11–15.  
 81.  Id. at 19.  
 82.  Id.  
 83.  See id. at 23. “Risk mitigation” refers to fraud detection products. For example, a risk 
mitigation product might flag a customer using a fraudulent social security to apply for a credit 
card. “People search products” are tools consumers might use to conduct a search on, for example, 
a particular person or address. Popular providers include Spokeo and ZoomInfo. See Steven 
Melendez & Alex Pasternack, Here Are the Data Brokers Quietly Buying and Selling Your 
Personal Information, FAST CO. (Mar. 2, 2019), https://www.fastcompany.com/90310803/here-
are-the-data-brokers-quietly-buying-and-selling-your-personal-information (discussing data 
broker products).  
 84.  Matthew Crain, The Limits of Transparency: Data Brokers and Commodification, 20 
NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 88, 90 (2018).  
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one of the country’s largest data brokers, was hacked, exposing the data 
of 145 million Americans.85 Four members of China’s military were 
later indicted for the hacking.86 Equifax was just one example of the 
growing use of data hacks. As attack technology advances, foreign 
nations leverage their expertise and resources to gain advantage over 
U.S. systems.87 The statistics corroborate the increasing ease of hacks: 
The number of data breaches grows every year,88 and since the 
beginning of 2010, there have been an estimated 40,650 personal data 
hacks.89 
One might reasonably think that these companies could impose 
cybersecurity measures sufficient to guard against a data breach. 
However, some mistakes cannot be mitigated by even the best 
cybersecurity infrastructure. Human error, like failing to install a 
security patch, can open the door to a mass data breach that affects 
millions.90 So long as companies continue to collect and store personal 
data, the risk of a hack will persist. 
C.  Selling Data and the Risk of Sales to Foreign Governments 
The sale of personal data is another major risk about which 
consumers are often unaware.91 Consider, for example, the 
consequences of sending a vial of saliva to 23andMe, a DNA processing 
service. When 23andMe users click “I DO CONSENT” at the bottom 
of the company privacy policy, as do 80 percent of 23andMe’s customer 
base, they permit GlaxoSmithKline, a pharmaceutical manufacturer, to 
view the information gleaned from their saliva and to use that data in 
 
 85.  Katie Benner, U.S. Charges Chinese Military Officers in 2017 Equifax Hacking, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 10, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/10/us/politics/equifax-hack-china.html. 
 86.  Id.  
 87.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-18-622, HIGH RISK SERIES: URGENT 
ACTIONS ARE NEEDED TO ADDRESS CYBERSECURITY CHALLENGES FACING THE NATION 1, 2 
(2018), https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/694355.pdf (noting that “rapid developments in new 
technologies” have given sophisticated foreign nations the expertise needed to impose “increasing 
risks”). 
 88.  Chris Morris, Hackers Had a Banner Year in 2019, FORTUNE (Jan. 28, 2020), 
https://fortune.com/2020/01/28/2019-data-breach-increases-hackers/.  
 89.  Megan Leonhardt, The 10 Biggest Data Hacks of the Decade, CNBC (Dec. 27, 2019), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/12/23/the-10-biggest-data-hacks-of-the-decade.html. 
 90.  See Benner, supra note 85 (noting that the Equifax hack was due to a failure to install a 
security patch).  
 91.  See Your Data Is Shared and Sold. . .What’s Being Done About It?, 
KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON (Oct. 29, 2019), https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/data-
shared-sold-whats-done/# (stating that “[u]p to 73% of American adults incorrectly believe that 
the existence of a privacy policy means a website cannot share their data with other parties 
without their permission”). 
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drug development.92 
Although 23andMe discloses where your data ends up, data brokers 
do not.93 Thus, in the context of personal data sales, data brokers are 
particularly risky. Data brokers are different from something like 
Facebook, which encounters a certain amount of scrutiny because of its 
notoriety and size. In contrast, data brokers operate in the shadows—
they collect data without consumer knowledge, make inferences about 
the data, and sell the data to largely unknown customers.94 Although 
some data brokers screen their customers to ensure above-the-board 
data use, there is no law defining who can and cannot buy these mass 
collections of data.95 
This lack of transparency means that hostile actors could purchase 
personal information from data brokers. Recent history shows these 
security concerns are well-founded. In 2014, the data broker LeapLab 
bought payday loan applications that included consumers’ names, 
addresses, phone numbers, employers, Social Security numbers, and 
bank account numbers.96 LeapLab sold that information to Ideal 
Financial Solutions, which used the consumer information to make 
millions of dollars in phony purchases.97 
If there is no regulatory mechanism preventing personal data sales 
to Ideal Financial, there is certainly nothing stopping the Chinese 
government, or any other foreign government for that matter, from 
buying Americans’ data through data brokers.98 In that sense, there is 
no material difference between sharing data under foreign national 
security law and buying it on the open market. 
 
 92.  See Megan Molteni, 23andMe’s Pharma Deals Have Been the Plan All Along, WIRED 
(Aug. 3, 2018), https://www.wired.com/story/23andme-glaxosmithkline-pharma-deal/ (describing 
how 23andMe develops biological insights from a customer’s saliva, such as predisposition to 
disease, which is then passed on to GlaxoSmithKline to determine targets for drug development). 
 93.  See Crain, supra note 84, at 91 (describing the information asymmetry between a general 
public that is “increasingly [subject to] extensive forms of monitoring” and the “institutions doing 
the monitoring [that remain] hidden from view”). 
 94.  Id. 
 95.  FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 79, at 40–41. 
 96.  FTC v. Ideal Fin. Sols., Inc., No. 2:13-cv-00143-JAD-GWF, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
86348, at *9 (D. Nev. June 29, 2015).  
 97.  Id.  
 98.  See Dymples Leong & Teo-Yi-Ling, Data Brokers: A Weak Link in National Security, 
THE DIPLOMAT (Aug. 21, 2020), https://thediplomat.com/2020/08/data-brokers-a-weak-link-in-
national-security/ (“American companies can still sell data to third-party data brokers, even after 
buying ownership of foreign-based apps. Those brokers could then turn around and sell the data 
to the Chinese government.”). 
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D.  The Consequences of Data Acquisition 
To some, the fact that foreign governments can easily acquire 
Americans’ personal data is self-evidently terrifying. Others might ask, 
“so what?” Although foreign actors’ goals in harvesting American data 
may not be entirely clear at first, recent history provides some answers. 
First, as discussed in Part I, personal data could be used to infiltrate 
and corrupt American elections through the spread of disinformation.99 
By combining different sets of data, Cambridge Analytica researchers 
developed a method to “microtarget” individuals, allowing them, for 
example, to identify people “vulnerable to [extremist] messaging—
people who were more prone to conspiratorial thinking or paranoid 
ideation” and could be convinced to join the alt-right.100 The targeted 
individuals often spread their misinformed beliefs across social media 
channels, effectively creating a self-perpetuating propaganda 
machine.101 Since 2016, microtargeting has become one prong102 in vast 
campaigns to spread disinformation on social media by countries like 
Venezuela, Bangladesh, Iran, Russia and China.103 
Second, personal data can be used to identify and recruit U.S. 
dissidents to serve as informants for foreign governments.104 After 
major data breaches at Equifax, the Office of Personnel Management, 
and Marriott were linked to the Chinese government, many in the 
cyber intelligence community concluded that the Chinese were 
building a database on U.S. citizens.105 Recent scholarship contends that 
one purpose of this database is to target persons of interest who have 
 
 99.  See supra Part I(B). 
 100.  Terry Gross, Fresh Air: Whistleblower Explains How Cambridge Analytica Helped Fuel 
U.S. ‘Insurgency,’ NPR (Oct. 9, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/10/08/768216311/whistleblower-
explains-how-cambridge-analytica-helped-fuel-u-s-insurgency (describing how Cambridge 
Analytica targeted “people  prone to conspiratorial thinking” in disinformation campaigns).   
 101.  Id.  
 102.  Other methods include bots and trolls. See., e.g, How is Fake News Spread? Bots, People 
Like You, Trolls and Microtargeting, CENTER FOR INFO. TECH. & SOC., 
https://www.cits.ucsb.edu/fake-news/spread. 
 103.  Sheera Frenkel et al., Russia’s Playbook for Social Media Disinformation Has Gone 
Global, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/31/technology/twitter-
disinformation-united-states-russia.html (describing the growing use of microtargeting 
techniques to spread disinformation in the U.S. and other countries); Kate Conger, Facebook and 
Twitter Say China Is Spreading Disinfomation in Hong Kong, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 19, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/19/technology/hong-kong-protests-china-disinformation-
facebook-twitter.html.  
 104.  Ming S. Chen, China’s Data Collection on US Citizens: Implications, Risks, and 
Solutions, 15 J. OF SCI. P. & GOVERNANCE 1, 1 (2019).  
 105.  Charles J. Dunlap Jr., The Hyper-Personalization of War: Cyber, Big Data, and the 
Changing Face of Conflict, 15 GEO. J OF INT’L AFF. 108, 110 (2014).  
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access to confidential governmental information, and could be 
persuaded or blackmailed to spy on the U.S. government.106 
Collection of personal data also poses the risk that the information 
could be used to extort intelligence officials or military servicemembers 
for political favors.107 Hostile foreign actors could recover sensitive 
personal information about servicemembers’ children, spouses, family 
and friends, using the data collection techniques discussed above. Such 
information could allow these actors to build detailed profiles on 
government officials, including their childrens’ schools, spouse’s 
workplaces, personal bank account information, etc. Those profiles 
could then be used to “plot all kinds of actual malevolence . . . . or to 
simply craft very precise threats toward their families” in order to 
retrieve confidential information or create paranoia.108 
Ultimately, the marketplace for data has inherent risks that cannot 
be ameliorated through bans on individual applications or even back-
end regulation on companies. The personal data industry is too 
interconnected and opaque for that. Even if a ban prevents one 
company from providing data to a foreign government, there is nothing 
stopping hostile actors from hacking into databases or buying that 
information on the open market. No matter what path it takes, 
Americans’ personal data in the hands of a hostile foreign government 
poses a threat to our national security. The only way to ensure our 
personal data stays out of the wrong hands is to limit its collection in 
the first place. 
III.  A MISAPPLICATION OF THE IEEPA TO DATA PRIVACY 
Given the breadth and severity of the personal data security risk, 
one might think that a new administration would have imposed a broad 
regulatory scheme to enhance data protection. However, the Trump 
Administration criticized comprehensive legislation, and instead 
adopted an ad hoc approach.109 In banning TikTok as described above, 
President Trump did little to impact the broader problem, i.e., the 
opacity of the data marketplace and its inability to prevent personal 
 
 106.  See Chen, supra note 104, at 8 (describing how the database allows intelligence officials 
to spot, assess, and develop potential recruits).  
 107.  Dunlap, supra note 105 at 115.  
 108.  Id.  
 109.  See Mulligan, supra note 35, at 51–52 (describing how the Trump administration 
perceived “regulator-focused pirvacy policies and check boxes” as only serving “a very small 
number of users”).  
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data from ending up in the wrong hands. 
The use of the IEEPA, in particular, evinces a misunderstanding of 
the threat. Accordingly, this Part will examine the IEEPA in its 
application to cybersecurity issues stemming from TikTok. The use of 
the IEEPA to regulate data privacy is inappropriate (and, arguably, 
unlawful) for three reasons. First, the IEEPA was designed to combat 
unusual and extraordinary threats, not the ongoing and widespread 
data security crisis. Second, the TikTok ban violates the IEEPA 
exclusion on “informational materials.” Finally, as a policy matter, 
Congress should have a greater role in regulating data security than an 
IEEPA framework would permit. 
A. The IEEPA Was Not Intended to Apply to Widespread Threats 
Using the IEEPA to combat ongoing threats contravenes its 
legislative purpose. Employing IEEPA powers should be narrowly 
tailored to respond to a “true” national emergency, an “unusual and 
extraordinary threat.”110 Instead, Presidents have invoked the statute 
broadly, and critics have recognized that the IEEPA is ripe for abuse.111 
As one commentator noted, “[t]hese uses suggest that the statute can 
and will be invoked whenever the President desires to draw on its broad 
powers, whether or not there is a genuine emergency.”112 Despite this 
overbroad usage, courts are reluctant to question a President’s 
declaration of a national emergency.113 
The first time the IEEPA was invoked was a true national 
emergency. During the Iran hostage crisis, two specific events 
constituted “unusual and extraordinary threat[s]” triggering President 
Carter’s powers under the IEEPA: the taking of hostages by Iranian 
students with the endorsement of the insurgent party in Iran and the 
insurgent party’s threat to withdraw Iranian funds from U.S. 
 
 110.  Trading With the Enemy Act Reform Legislaton: Hearing and Markup before the H. 
Comm. on Int’l Rel. on H.R. 7738, 95th Cong. 14 (1977).  
 111.  See Peter Harrell, The Right Way to Reform the U.S. President’s International Emergency 
Powers, JUST SECURITY (Mar. 26, 2020), https://www.justsecurity.org/69388/the-right-way-to-
reform-the-u-s-presidents-international-emergency-powers/ (noting that the IEEPA’s broad 
grant of power to the president may allow a quick governmental response in times of genuine 
emergency, but that the statute’s breadth renders it easily abused). 
 112.  Jules Lobel, Emergency Power and the Decline of Liberalism, 98 YALE L. J. 1385, 1415 
(1989) (quoting Carter, International Economic Sanctions, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1159, 1235 (1987)). 
 113.  See Koh, supra note 25, at 1313 (descrbing how the Court’s “decisions on the merits of 
foreign affairs claims have enouraged a steady fllow of policymaking power from Congress to the 
Executive”). 
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institutions.114 As the House Report reviewing these events noted, 
“[s]uch a triggering of the IEEPA . . . was certainly consistent with the 
legislative history of that act.”115 In this case, the inciting incidents were 
isolated and identifiable. 
Although use of the IEEPA should be limited to true national 
emergencies, oftentimes its application does not appear to meet the 
threshold for an unusual and extraordinary threat, as required under 
the statute. For example, multiple presidents have declared national 
emergencies in order to reinstate export regulations that were initially 
developed and passed by Congress.116 In particular, President Reagan 
used the IEEPA to extend the Export Administration Act when 
Congress failed to renew the Act itself.117 Commentators recognized 
that classifying the renewal as a “national emergency” stretched the 
standards for application of the IEEPA.118 Regardless, a district court 
held that this did not contravene the statute because Congress had not 
amended he IEEPA to prohibit that practice.119 
President Trump’s ban on TikTok is far more similar to the latter 
application of the IEEPA. If the ban were enacted, President Trump 
would subvert the intent of the IEEPA. Declaring a national 
emergency under such circumstances would serve no other purpose but 
to further his own political agenda. Although ineffective personal data 
privacy regulation does pose a grave national security threat, TikTok 
itself is an insignificant fragment of that risk. TikTok alone cannot meet 
the threshold of an unusual and extraordinary threat as required by the 
IEEPA. Whereas the Carter Administration imposed appropriately 
long-term remedies to confront an unusual emergency threat,120 the 
Trump Administration proposes a short-term solution to an endemic 
cybersecurity risk. 
 
 114.  See STAFF OF H. COMM. ON BANKING, FIN. & URB. AFF., 97TH CONG., 1ST SESS., IRAN: 
THE FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF THE HOSTAGE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT, 1213 (Comm. Print 
1981) (noting that President Carter froze Iranian assets in response to the “barbaric political 
actions of the Iranian students” and the statement by an Iranian spokesman that Iran would 
repudiate all U.S. debts and withdraw its funds from U.S. depository institutions).   
 115.  Id. at 12.  
 116.  See CASEY ET AL., supra note 21, at 41–42 (noting that President Reagan was the first to 
use the IEEPA to extend export controls); see also Joel B. Harris & Jeffrey P. Bialos, The Strange 
New World of United States Export Controls under the International Emergency Economic Powers 
Act, 18 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 71, 81 (1985) (discussing President Reagan’s use of the IEEPA). 
 117.  Id. at 82.  
 118.  Id.  
 119.  United States v. Groos, 616 F. Supp. 2d 777, 785 (N.D. Ill. 2008). 
 120.  These “long-term remedies” include economic sanctions that, to this day, shape the 
context of U.S.-Iran relations. See Casey et al., supra note 21, at 18–19.  
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Further, the use of the IEEPA to ban TikTok is questionable 
because it insulates the President’s decision from judicial scrutiny and 
obscures the scale and scope of the dangers of data mining. First, the 
courts’ tendency to refuse review of IEEPA actions makes challenging 
the ban particularly difficult. Given the broad discretion granted to the 
President under IEEPA precedent, a court might refuse to hear 
legitimate constitutional challenges on the grounds that invoking the 
IEEPA raises a nonjusticiable political question.121 If that’s the case, 
proponents of a comprehensive data privacy framework would have 
little opportunity to oppose this ad hoc approach, and would require 
Congress to pass alternative legislation undermining the executive 
order before comprehensive legislation could be implemented. 
More importantly, regulating TikTok under the guise of a national 
emergency signals that TikTok is an isolated problem and obscures the 
scale of the threat. As explained in Part II, the transfer of Americans’ 
personal data to hostile actors does pose a national security concern. 
However, TikTok’s data mining practices do not pose an unusual and 
extraordinary threat to Americans. Rather, the information TikTok 
collects is typical of the industry writ large.122 Therefore, focusing a ban 
on TikTok alone is ultimately a distraction from a broader national 
security solution: tightening the regulation of what personal data could 
be collected.123  It is vital that Americans fully understand the scope of 
the cybersecurity threat so that comprehensive legislation can be 
enacted to combat it. 
B.  The TikTok Ban Violates the IEEPA Carve-out on Personal 
Communications and Informational Materials 
The TikTok ban is improper under the IEEPA because IEEPA 
specifically exempts “informational materials” and “personal 
communications” from its reach. Known as the “Berman Amendment,” 
the revision to the statute was meant to obviate First Amendment 
challenges to IEEPA use: 
The authority granted to the President by this section does not 
 
 121.  See infra Part III(B) for a discussion of some possible challenges.  
 122.  See Kevin Collier, TikTok a Privacy Threat? Sure, But So Are Most of Your Smartphone 
Apps, NBC NEWS (July 13, 2020), https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/security/tiktok-privacy-threat-
sure-so-are-most-your-smartphone-apps-n1233625 (noting that it is “the norm” for phone apps to 
collect location data, usernames, phone numbers, device tupes, and more). 
 123.  See Aaronson, supra note 71, at 1819 (observing that Canadian and German 
governments have instead focused on regulating “where and how” data is stored rather than 
banning individual apps).  
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include the authority to regulate or prohibit, directly or indirectly 
. . . any postal, telegraphic, telephonic, or other personal 
communication, which does not involve a transfer of anything of 
value . . . . or the importation from any country, or the exportation 
to any country, whether commercial or otherwise, regardless of 
format or medium of transmission, of any information materials, 
including but not limited to, publications, films, posters, phonograph 
records, photographs, microfilms, microfiche, tapes, compact disks, 
CD ROMs, artworks, and news wire feeds.124 
Although the examples of informational materials may seem out of 
date, the legislative history of the Berman Amendment shows that 
Congress had intended for these limitations to apply broadly. In a 
House Report describing the purpose of the Amendment, the drafters 
noted that 
[T]he principle that no prohibitions should exist on imports to the 
United States of ideas and information if their circulation is 
protected by the First Amendment. That principle applies with 
equal force to the exportation of ideas and information from this 
country to the rest of the world. Accordingly, these sections also 
exempt informational materials and publications from the export 
restrictions that may be imposed under these acts.125 
In Congress’s formulation, then, any information protected by 
constitutional speech is excepted from the President’s authority under 
the IEEPA. Congress has also expanded the exceptions under the 
Amendment, noting that informational materials may include 
technologies and software.126 
However, judicial deference to the President might limit the scope 
of this exception. A recent case interpreting the Amendment remarked, 
“[w]ith the Berman Amendment . . . . Congress sought to ensure the 
robust exchange of informational materials would not be unduly 
inhibited . . . .”127 However, that same court upheld IEEPA regulation 
of software on the narrow grounds that only informational materials 
 
 124.  50 U.S.C. § 1702(b). 
 125.  H.R. Rep. No. 100-40, Part . 3, at 113 (1987).  
 126.  See 31 C.F.R § 560.418 (2009) (Iranian sanction regulations state that technology and 
software transmitted to Iran would violate that sanction “unless that technology or software meets 
the definition of information and informational materials in [the Berman Amendment] . . . .”). 
 127.  See United States v. Amirnazmi, 645 F.3d 564, 586 (3d Cir. 2011). In this case, the 
defendant developed a software which allowed users to plan and study chemical reactions. The 
software was then sold to the state-sponsored National Petrochemical Company of Iran. Because 
the software required tailoring to the end-user after sale, it was not “fully created and in existence” 
at the point of sale, and therefore could be regulated under the IEEPA. 
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“fully created and in existence” were subject to the exception.128 
Because the software at issue was customizable, it was not “fully 
created.”129 The court concluded that regulation of those materials is 
“not sacrosanct” as a result of the Amendment.130 This holding 
indicates that, although the Amendment restricts the President’s 
IEEPA authority to some extent, deference to the executive likely 
overrides certain applications of the exception. 
The language and purpose of the Berman Amendment squarely 
encompasses things like TikTok. TikTok clearly involves the 
“exportation of ideas and information” from users in the United States 
to users abroad, and vice-versa. As stated above, TikTok users produce 
and share short-form videos on any topic—this is tantamount to the 
“film” exception enumerated in the statute. These videos are the 
products of users’ constitutionally protected speech. Indeed, this was 
the very reason why a federal district court blocked the TikTok ban in 
late September 2020.131 
Depending on how broadly a court interprets the exception, it is 
hard to imagine a ban on any app, not just TikTok, that would not 
violate the Amendment. Consider, for example, a ban on WhatsApp, an 
application that allows users to send text messages, video calls, images, 
etc.132 Although WhatsApp was founded in the U.S., it has been 
vulnerable to hackers, as evidenced by a recent spyware attack.133 Say, 
hypothetically, that the hack was coordinated by a foreign government. 
If President Trump had used his IEEPA powers to ban WhatsApp, the 
ban would probably be challenged on Berman Amendment grounds. 
WhatsApp, like many other apps, involves users exchanging ideas and 
information—precisely what the exception is meant to protect. 
To take an even broader perspective, a court might consider any 
transfer of personal data to be protectable under the exception as an 
 
 128.  Id.   
 129.  Id. at 588.  
 130.  Id. at 587.  
 131.  TikTok Inc. v. Trump, No. 1:20-cv-02658, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177250, at *16–17 
(D.D.C. Sept. 27, 2020). 
 132.  Chandra Steele, What Is WhatsApp? An Explainer, PCMAG (Feb. 20, 2014), 
https://www.pcmag.com/news/what-is-whatsapp-an-explainer.  
 133.  See Zak Doffman, WhatsApp Users Beware: This Stupidly Simple New Hack Puts You 
At Risk—Here’s What You Do, FORBES (Jan. 25, 2020), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/zakdoffman/2020/01/25/whatsapp-users-beware-this-stupidly-
simple-new-hack-puts-you-at-riskheres-what-you-do/?sh=62047a5b1d76 (describing a 
WhatsApp vulnerability that allowed hackers to gain access to accounts by relying on users’ 
“susceptibility to social engineering”). 
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expression of speech. Commentators and courts are divided over the 
question of whether personal data is speech.134 Given the complexity of 
these arguments, this debate is outside of the context of this Note. 
Suffice it to say that if data is speech, the IEEPA cannot touch personal 
data, and thus cannot be used to protect it. 
C.  Congress’s Role in Regulating Data Privacy Should Be Enhanced 
As a policy matter, Congress should have a greater role in 
regulating data security than the IEEPA framework allows. Although 
the IEEPA was designed to enhance Congress’s role in foreign affairs, 
it has had the opposite effect. Presidents have used the IEEPA to 
impose unitary executive action while Congress has been sidelined. 
Virtually none of the congressional oversight mechanisms in the 
IEEPA is effective. The primary tool in the original version of the 
IEEPA was a legislative veto of the President’s emergency declaration. 
That provision states: “[t]he authorities described in subsection (a)(1) 
may not continue to be exercised under this section if the national 
emergency is terminated by the Congress by concurrent resolution . . . . 
and if the Congress specifies in such concurrent resolution that such 
authorities may not continue to be exercised under this section.”135 
However, as a result of INS v. Chadha, which held that the legislative 
veto violated constitutional separation of powers, Congress would 
likely need a two-thirds majority (a veto-proof supermajority) to 
“veto” an emergency declaration.136 In this era of hyper-partisanship, it 
is highly unlikely that any vote could garner that much support.137 
Congress itself is to blame for neglecting some of its supervisory 
duties in this area. Although the IEEPA stipulates that Congress meet 
every six months to discuss existing national emergencies, Congress has 
 
 134.  Compare Jane Bambauer, Is Data Speech?, 66 STAN. L. REV. 57 (2014) (arguing that 
data is speech) with Neil M. Richards, Reconciling Data Privacy and the First Amendment, 52 
U.C.L.A. L. R. 1149 (2005) (arguing that data is not speech); Neil M. Richards, Why Data Privacy 
Law Is (Mostly) Constitutional, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1501 (2015). 
 135.  50 U.S.C. § 1706(b) (2018). 
 136.  See 462 U.S. 919, 935 (1983) (holding that Congress cannot void the exercise of power 
by the executive branch through concurrent resolution, and can act only through bicameral 
passage followed by presentment of the law to the President).  
 137.  See Elizabeth Goitein, How Congress Is Pushing Back Against Trump’s Unprecedented 
Use of Emergency Powers, WASH. POST (Sept. 25, 2020), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/09/25/how-congress-is-pushing-back-against-
trumps-unprecedented-use-emergency-powers/ (noting that a veto-proof supermajority would 
today be “nearly impossible to achieve”).  
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not once fulfilled this requirement.138 Coupled with the courts’ 
hesitation to question the President’s emergency powers, the bloated 
statute gives essentially limitless power to the President. 
This lack of oversight is of concern to Congress. Currently, there are 
two bipartisan bills pending in Congress that would reinstate the 
oversight the enacting Congress intended. One of these proposals 
would impose a 30-day period after a national emergency is declared 
wherein Congress must vote to extend the emergency if they want it to 
continue.139 As the sponsor of that proposal, Senator Mike Lee (R-UT) 
notes, “[t]he problem is that emergency powers are vulnerable to abuse; 
they can act as a cheat-code that undermines of system of separation of 
powers and enables the president to bypass the difficult work of 
enacting legislation.”140 
In effect, the IEEPA allows the President unilateral control over 
federal data privacy policy, unless Congress acts to implement its own 
legislation. Under the IEEPA, President Trump could have banned all 
applications that pose some sort of data security threat with origins 
outside the U.S.141 That would include not just apps made in China, but 
those made in Russia or any other OFAC-listed country.142 Not only 
would that be a step too far, it’s unlikely to effectively address 
widespread data security concerns.143 
The security risks attendant to personal data protection are 
important enough that Congress deserves a seat at the table. The 
President should not unilaterally dictate policy, even if national security 
issues are traditionally the province of the executive branch. Although 
data privacy incidents implicate foreign affairs, the interdependencies 
of online networks go beyond the foreign versus domestic binary. The 
data protection problem is not raised by unique threat actors or foreign 
adversaries, it is a far-reaching issue that has direct, domestic effects. 
 
 138.  Elizabeth Goitein, The Alarming Scope of the President’s Emergency Powers, ATLANTIC 
(Jan./Feb. 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2019/01/presidential-emergency-
powers/576418/.  
 139.  Assuring that Robust, Thorough, and Informed Congressional Leadership is Exercised 
Over National Emergencies (ARTICLE ONE) Act, S. 764, 116th Cong. § 202(a) (2019).  
 140.  Sen. Lee Introduces ARTICLE ONE Act to Reclaim Congressional Power, MIKE LEE: 
U.S. SEN. FOR UTAH (Mar. 12, 2019), https://www.lee.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2019/3/sen-lee-
introduces-article-one-act-to-reclaim-congressional-power.  
 141.  Although in theory the Berman Amendment should prevent the President from banning 
any application that trades in informational materials, the fact that President Trump attempted 
to ban TikTok indicates that interpretations of what may qualify under the exception can differ.  
 142.  See supra note 76 and accompanying text.  
 143.  See supra Part II(A)–(C).   
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Therefore, the traditional foreign policy principle delegating authority 
to the President simply does not apply here.144 Because the IEEPA 
codifies that principle, its use is inappropriate when applied to personal 
data privacy. 
Instead, Congress needs to intervene. Only Congress has the ability 
to adopt the broad legislative reforms required to protect American’s 
personal data,145 and only Congress can unify fragmented federal and 
state law to bring the U.S. in accord with its international peers.146 The 
alternative, entrusting data protection to industry and the executive 
branch, will leave U.S. citizens’ personal data and the nation as a whole 
vulnerable to attack. 
IV. FEDERAL DATA PRIVACY REGULATION 
Relying on the IEEPA to protect Americans’ data privacy is an 
untenable solution. Although the government is not wrong to view the 
data privacy threat that TikTok and other similar services present as a 
national security risk, threats to data privacy are ubiquitous and cannot 
be dealt with through unitary executive action under the IEEPA. A 
comprehensive problem requires a comprehensive solution. 
Reviewing the deficiencies of the IEEPA raises the question: Is 
there a way to regulate personal data that (1) sufficiently tackles the 
breadth of the cybersecurity issue, (2) avoids First Amendment free 
speech challenges, and (3) incorporates both congressional and 
executive branch concerns? Any effective legislation would also need 
to address the problem at its source—i.e. what data can be collected 
and what companies can do with that data. 
California’s Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) provides a model for 
such national legislation.147 Although the CCPA is costly and raises 
 
 144.  Much has been written about separation of powers in the realm of foreign affairs. 
Judicial interpretations have generally upheld the President’s broad discretion in this area. See, 
e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936) (holding that “the 
President [is] is the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations”); 
but see Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring) (stating that “[w]hen the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or 
denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone of 
twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is 
uncertain”). 
 145.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.  
 146.  See Mulligan, supra note 35, at 3 (“This fragmented legal landscape coupled with 
concerns that existing federal laws are inadequate has led many stakeholders to argue that the 
federal government should assume a larger role in data protection policy.”).  
 147.  Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.100 (West 2020). 
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potential federalism issues, it exemplifies a much-needed effort to 
proactively regulate data privacy. The CCPA protects consumer privacy 
at the point of collection, regulates what companies may do with 
personal data, and avoids the defects of an ad hoc method. Although 
the CCPA is not a complete solution, it provides a framework for 
workable federal legislation. 
A.  The CCPA 
The CCPA began as a 2017 ballot initiative for sweeping changes to 
existing privacy law. The purpose of the bill was to protect individuals’ 
“inalienable” right to privacy, fundamental to which was the “ability of 
individuals to control the use, including the sale, of their personal 
information.”148 
The legislation, which took effect in early 2020, provides that any 
business operating in California that meets certain criteria must comply 
with several regulations relating to personal data security.149 First, 
businesses that sell personal data (including data brokers) must give 
consumers the right to opt out of the sale if they request.150 Second, 
consumers can request that businesses disclose whatever personal 
information they have collected, why they collected it, and what was 
done with the information.151 Consumers are also afforded a private 
right of action in the event of a data breach.152 Finally, consumers can 
request that businesses delete their personal data, and businesses must 
respond within 45 days.153 Although not directly part of the CCPA, 
California law also requires that data brokers register with the state, 
another effort to increase transparency.154 In providing consumers the 
tools to manage their data, the CCPA takes the initial step in reducing 
the ways that businesses can use that data. In doing so, the CCPA aims 
to protect consumer privacy at its source: the collection stage. 
On a federal level, the enactment of the CCPA drew renewed 
 
 148.  A.B. 375, 2019 Cal. St. Assemb. (Cal. 2019). 
 149.  See Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.105 –140(c) (West 2020) (“The CCPA applies to for-profit 
businesses that do business in California and meet any of the following: have a gross annual 
revenue of over $25 million; buy, receive, or sell the personal information of 50,000 or more 
California residents, households, or devices; or derive 50% or more of their annual revenue from 
selling California residents’ personal information.”). 
 150.  Id. at § 1798.05(a). 
 151.  Id. at § 1798.110(a). 
 152.  Id. at § 1798.150(a). 
 153.  Id. at §1798.130(a)(2)(A). 
 154.  Id. at §§ 1798.99.80–88. 
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attention to data privacy.155 Several bipartisan legislative proposals 
modeled on the CCPA have been introduced.156 Despite broad 
agreement on the need to create a federal data protection law, these 
recently introduced and past legislative proposals have been held up in 
Congress.157 To appreciate why requires an understanding of the policy 
debate at the heart of these issues: the primacy of data privacy versus 
the economic and political risks in enacting those policies. 
First, lobbyists decried the CCPA’s financial costs.158 Initial CCPA 
compliance for companies in California was projected to cost up to $55 
billion.159 The costs of implementation and compliance on a national 
level would, of course, be drastically higher. And beyond the immediate 
financial costs are potential future costs to the advertising industry. By 
limiting access to personal data, targeted advertising may be similarly 
curtailed.160 Limiting behavioral advertising may also have significant 
downstream effects on the economy.161 Although those financial 
consequences deserve due consideration, they simply cannot outweigh 
the necessity of comprehensive data privacy legislation. Though the 
financial costs of compliance would be significant, the impacts of not 
complying transcend purely economic concerns. Without personal data 
privacy protection, we risk a repeat of the Cambridge Analytica 
incident, of further data breaches, and of greater threats to our national 
security.162 
Second, consumer privacy advocates protested that the CCPA did 
 
 155.  See David McCabe, Congress and Trump Agreed They Want a National Privacy Law. It 
Is Nowhere in Sight., N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 1, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/01/technology/national-privacy-law.html (“[Tech] industry 
groups flooded Washington with a clear message meant to neutralize California’s rules entirely. 
Congress should pass a national privacy law, they said, and include a provision superseding any 
state legislation on the issue.”). 
 156.  See generally Setting an American Framework to Ensure Data Access, Transparency, 
and Accountability (SAFE DATA) Act, S. 3663, 116th Cong. (2020); see also Data Broker 
Accountability and Transparency Act of 2020, H.R. 6675, 116th Cong. (2020). 
 157.  See McCabe, supra note 151 and accompanying text.   
 158.  Id. 
 159.  Caitlin Chin, Highlights: The GDPR and CCPA as Benchmarks For Federal Privacy 
Legislation, BROOKINGS INST. (Dec. 19, 2019), 
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2019/12/19/highlights-the-gdpr-and-ccpa-as-
benchmarks-for-federal-privacy-legislation/. 
 160.  See Theodore F. Claypoole, Will CCPA Kill Advertising as We Know It?, 10 NAT’L L. 
REV. 1, 2  (2020) (noting that the regulation could allow consumers to avoid targeted advertising 
through browser plug-ins.).  
 161.  See id.(“Data is the currency of this advertising world, and the CCPA if strictly enforced 
could cripple many of the advances made in the past 30 years.”).   
 162.  See supra Part II(C) for a discussion of how national security concerns include the spread 
of propaganda and targeting of intelligence and military officials.  
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not go far enough in protecting personal data.163 These activists 
asserted that the CCPA would not adequately protect consumer data 
because it shifts much of the burden onto consumers to affirmatively 
exercise their rights.164 In that sense, the CCPA does not constrain data 
collection at all.165 However, this argument misses the point of the 
CCPA. The legislation was always meant to act as an initial step towards 
privacy protection, rather than as a sweeping defense of consumer 
rights.166 And still, the CCPA is widely considered the most extensive 
data protection regime in the United States.167 In fact, the CCPA’s 
status as a baseline measure has already been proven. In November 
2020, California voters approved the California Privacy Rights Act 
(CPRA), which expands the CCPA’s opt-out right and private right of 
action, and institutes a privacy regulatory body and a right to correct 
personal information under the CCPA.168 
Finally, those concerned that the CCPA might provide a basis for 
federal legislation wondered how a “federal CCPA” might preempt 
existing state privacy law. Several states have enacted legislation similar 
to the CCPA,169 but may differ in some important respects.170 Here, a 
federal CCPA could provide a floor, rather than a ceiling, for state law. 
In other words, federal legislation would preempt existing state law, but 
only to the extent that state law fails to meet the standards outlined by 
the CCPA.171 
 
 163.  See e.g., GDPR & CCPA: Opt-ins, Consumer Control, and the Impact on Competition 
and Innovation: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. 1 (2019) (Statement 
of Michelle Richardson, Director, Privacy & Data Center for Democracy & Tech.) (“Privacy self-
management alone is neither scalable nor practical for the individual. Burdening individuals with 
more and more granular decisions, absent some reasonable boundaries, will not provide the 
systemic changes we need.”).   
 164.  Id.   
 165.  Id.  
 166.  See Revisiting the Need for Data Privacy Legislation: Hearing Before the S. Comm on 
Com., Sci. and Transp., 116th Cong. 2 (2020) (Statement of Xavier Becerra, Attorney General of 
the State of California) (“Like any law, the CCPA is not perfect, but it is an excellent first step.”).   
 167.  Id.  
 168.  See The California Privacy Rights Act of 2020, CA Proposition 24 (2020).  
 169.  Currently, only Virginia and Nevada have passed legislation similar to the CCPA, but 
legislation is pending in 24 other states. See Sarah Rippy, US State Comprehensive Privacy Law 
Comparison, IAPP WESTIN RESEARCH CTR., https://iapp.org/resources/article/state-
comparison-table/ (last visited Mar. 6, 2021). 
 170.  See Mulligan, supra note 35, at 37 (noting that the CCPA is particularly comprehensive 
relative to many other states’ laws). 
 171.  Arguably, this preemption approach would fail to unify state and federal law, as no 
single national data privacy standard would exist. See Cameron F. Kerry and John B. Morris, Jr., 
Preemption: A Balanced National Approach to Protecting all Americans’ Privacy, LAWFARE 
(June 18, 2020), https://www.lawfareblog.com/preemption-balanced-national-approach-
protecting-all-americans-privacy.  
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B.  The CCPA Overcomes the Deficiencies of an Ad Hoc Method 
Implementing legislation similar to the CCPA would also help 
address the three deficiencies of the IEEPA method: that ad hoc 
solutions do not comprehensively protect consumer privacy, any 
outright ban would encounter First Amendment challenges, and it 
permits unitary executive action when the decisionmaking process 
should include Congress. 
First, applying the CCPA on a federal level would represent an 
initial effort at combating the dangers of the data marketplace: namely, 
system hacks, data sharing with foreign governments, and selling 
personal data to hostile actors.172 To limit the likelihood of a hack, the 
CCPA gives consumers a private right of action in the event of a data 
breach. On a national level, this would encourage businesses to 
implement data protection measures on their own, such as limiting the 
amount of personal data collected, and deleting that data automatically 
when it is no longer needed. Also, the CCPA reduces the risk of data 
ending up in the hands of hostile actors because the Act gives 
consumers the right to limit the data they provide and sell. In short, the 
CCPA gives consumers dominion over their data. 
Furthermore, a national CCPA would not implicate First 
Amendment issues. Under the CCPA, consumers are free to create and 
share whatever information they want—they just have more control 
over where it ends up. Further, courts have recognized that a certain 
amount of privacy aids free expression and free association.173 In that 
sense, encouraging basic data protection could safeguard against these 
concerns. 
Finally, implementing the CCPA would require the cooperation of 
Congress. Given the patchwork of data privacy laws across the country, 
it is particularly important that a federal law harmonizes these 
approaches, understanding both industry and consumer considerations. 
Only Congress is suited to do that. As state data privacy laws gain 
momementum and bipartisan support for a federal approach builds, the 
time is ripe for Congress to enact meaningful legislation. 
Although a federal version of the CCPA would not eliminate all of 
 
 172.  See supra Part II(A)-(C).  
 173.  See, e.g., McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995) (holding that 
“[a]nonymity is a shield from the tyranny of the majority . . . . It thus exemplifies the purpose 
behind the Bill of Rights, and of the First Amendment in particular: to protect unpopular 
individuals from retaliation—and their ideas from suppression—at the hand of an intolerant 
society”). 
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the concerns presented by the mining of personal data, it is a solid 
foundation to initially address personal data privacy issues. Legislators 
must keep in mind that as time passes, the more personal data is 
collected and the more these risks are exacerbated. Therefore, 
Congress must act swiftly. Implementing legislation based on the 
existing CCPA framework represents the most efficient route to begin 
protecting Americans’ personal data. 
CONCLUSION 
The use of the IEEPA to ban TikTok, an ad hoc solution directed 
by the President, represents a flawed approach for the future of our 
national data privacy policy: the approach has been shown to be legally 
untenable and does not provide a comprehensive solution. Banning 
individual apps is insufficient to tackle the opacity of the personal data 
marketplace, the amount of data that is collected, and the many ways 
that data may be compromised. Inadequate data protection will 
continue to pose the risk that individual Americans’ personal data ends 
up in the wrong hands. An ambitious effort to develop comprehensive 
data privacy protection must be enacted, based on the foundation 
provided by the CCPA. The longer Congress waits to implement this 
legislation, the more the nation risks exposure to further unforeseen 
privacy attacks. 
 
